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UNTYING THE KNOT:
THE PROPRIETY OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S RECOGNITION

OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE

I.

INTRODUCTION

The recognition of marriage is a threshold determination in a variety of legal
contexts.' A court cannot address an alleged spouse's claim for property
distribution in divorce or probate proceedings without first determining whether
a marriage exists. Nor can the Workers' Compensation Commission or Social
Security Administration address the substantive issues of awarding spousal
benefits without a preliminary showing of marriage. Seemingly, this threshold
determination would be a simple barrier to overcome since a claimant need only
produce a marriage certificate to resolve the issue. However, in jurisdictions that
recognize the validity of a marriage despite a couple's noncompliance with
statutory ceremony and license requirements, the inquiry is more complicated.
These jurisdictions allow claimants the opportunity to convince the trier of fact
that a common law marriage exists, thereby interjecting an intensely factual
dispute into situations where the determination of marital status would otherwise
seem perfunctory. The contested issue of marital status can lead to litigation in
contexts such as probate proceedings or administrative determinations.
South Carolina is among a dwindling minority of jurisdictions that
recognize common law marriage.2 During the 2005 to 2006 South Carolina
General Assembly session, several representatives sponsored the introduction of
House Bill 3588, which proposed the abolition of common law marriage in
South Carolina.3 The bill passed in the House of Representatives but was never
voted on in the Senate.4 Within the past ten years, similar bills have been
introduced in the South Carolina House of Representatives on seven different

1. John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Overfor Common-Law Marriage:A Considerationof the
Continued Viability of the Common-Law MarriageDoctrine, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 399, 399 (1999).
2. Currently, eleven states (Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah) and the District of Columbia recognize
common law marriage. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (a) (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1 4.5 (1998 & Supp. 2006); Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., 915 F. Supp. 1158,1160 (D. Kan. 1996); Stringer
v. Stringer, 689 So. 2d 194, 195 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); In re Marriage of Cargill & Rollins, 843 P.2d
1335, 1339 (Colo. 1993); Coates v. Watts, 622 A.2d 25,29 (D.C. 1993); Conklin v. MacMillan Oil Co.,
557 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); In re Estate of Alcorn, 868 P.2d 629, 630 (Mont. 1994);
In re Estate of Buttrick, 597 A.2d 74, 76 (N.H. 1991) (recognizing common law marriage for
inheritance purposes only); In re Estate of Carroll, 749 P.2d 571, 574 (Okla. Civ. App. 1987); Petrarca
v. Castrovillari, 448 A.2d 1286, 1289 (R.I. 1982); Barker v. Baker, 330 S.C. 361, 367, 499 S.E.2d 503,
506 (Ct. App. 1998).
3. H.B. 3588, 116th Gen. Assem., I House Journal 1057 (S.C. 2005).
4. H.B. 3588, 116th Gen. Assem., 111 House Journal 2738-41 (S.C. 2005); H.B. 3588, South
Carolina Legislature Online, http://www.scstatehouse.net.
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occasions.' Thus, it is likely that the General Assembly will continue the

common law marriage debate.
Acknowledging the increase in cohabitation rates throughout the United
States6 and the historical circumstances originally addressed by recognizing
common law marriage, the question arises whether South Carolina should
continue to recognize the doctrine in contemporary society. The answer requires
a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the interests of those protected by the common
law marriage doctrine against the impact of the doctrine on couples' expectation

interests, on judicial economy, and on third party reliance on the certainty of
marriage formalities. This Comment assesses these factors in determining
whether South Carolina should indeed abandon the doctrine of common law
marriage. Part II identifies the elements necessary to establish a common law

marriage in South Carolina. Part III summarizes the historical development of
common law marriage in England, the United States, and South Carolina. Part
IV explores why most states have abolished the doctrine and addresses the

impact this abolition has had on couples traditionally protected by common law
marriage. Part V assesses the various alternatives to common law marriage, and

Part VI examines other areas of law where legal relationships are imposed
despite a failure to follow legal formalities. Part VII suggests that South
Carolina should abrogate the common law marriage doctrine to protect

expectation interests, promote judicial economy, and provide a bright-line rule
for unmarried cohabitants and third parties regarding their legal rights.
II.

ELEMENTS OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA

South Carolina generally requires couples to obtain a marriage license for
their marriage to be valid.7 However, South Carolina has codified the common
law marriage doctrine in section 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code, which
states that the failure to obtain a marriage license would not render a marriage
illegal. 8 South Carolina courts set forth two elements of common law marriage. 9

5. See H.B. 4597, 115th Gen. Assem., I House Journal 670 (S.C. 2004); H.B. 3625, 115th Gen.
Assem., I House Journal 924-25 (S.C. 2003); H.B. 3774, 114th Gen. Assem., II House Journal 1670-71
(S.C. 2001); H.B. 3452, 114th Gen. Assem., I House Journal 677-78 (S.C. 2001); H.B. 3668, 113th
Gen. Assem., I House Journal 986 (S.C. 1999); H.B. 3656, 113th Gen. Assem., I House Journal 953-54
(S.C. 1999); H.B. 4410, 113th Gen. Assem., I House Journal 105 (S.C. 1998). Each bill proposed to
abolish common law marriage in South Carolina; however, each bill was not enacted.
6. The 2000 Census identified 5.5 million couples in the United States who lived together but were
not married. TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE AND
UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at 1 (2003), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. This figure was an increase from the 3.2 million unmarried couples living
together in 1990. Id. In South Carolina, 8.3% of couple-households were unmarried cohabitants. Id. at
4.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-210 (1976 & Supp. 2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any persons to
contract matrimony within this State without first procuring a license .... ).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-360 (1976 & Supp. 2006) ("Nothing contained in this article shall
render illegal any marriage contracted without the issuance of a license.").
9. See Kirby v. Kirby, 270 S.C. 137, 140-42, 241 S.E.2d 415, 416-17 (1978).
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First, the parties must have the capacity to marry, ° and second, the facts and
circumstances must show an intention on the part of both parties to enter into a
marriage contract." This intention may be "evidenced by a public and
unequivocal declaration of the parties," or may be inferred from the parties

having lived together as husband and wife and having acquired a general
reputation as a married couple.' 2 Most common law marriage jurisdictions
impose a third requirement on those seeking to establish a common law
marriage: the couple must "hold themselves out" to the community as husband

and wife.' 3 South Carolina case law, however, does not require couples to hold
themselves out as a married couple as a separate third requirement, but instead

permits claimants to use community recognition and reputation to show the
intent to be married.' 4 In addition, the party asserting common law marriage in
South Carolina must prove the existence of the marriage by a preponderance of

the evidence.' 5

Like any marriage, common law marriage may exist only between parties
with the capacity to enter into a marital contract. 16 Thus, even if the parties
mutually intend to be married, an impediment to the marriage prevents the
formation of a common law marriage.' 7 South Carolina statutorily imposes
8
certain capacity requirements by preventing mentally incompetent persons,
persons of the same sex,' 9 and persons under the age of sixteen from contracting

to marry.2" If a party enters into a common law marriage while an impediment to
marriage exists and later that impediment is removed, capacity to marry is
reinstated; however, the relationship does not automatically become a common
law marriage. 2' Rather, the relationship remains non-marital until the parties
enter into a new mutual agreement. 2 They can form this new agreement through

10. See Callen v. Callen, 365 S.C. 618,624,620 S.E.2d 59,62 (2005); see also Johns v. Johns, 309
S.C. 199, 201-02, 420 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding a common law marriage void at its
inception because the parties were incapable of marrying due to an impediment).
11. See Callen, 365 S.C. at 624, 620 S.E.2d at 62 ("The fact finder is to look for mutual assent:
the intent of each party to be married to the other and a mutual understanding of each party's intent.").
12. See Kirby, 270 S.C. at 140, 241 S.E.2d at 416.
13. The majority ofjurisdictions recognizing common law marriage in the United States require
three elements: "(1) capacity to marry; (2) a present marriage agreement; and (3) a holding out of each
other as husband and wife to the public." Mary D. Feighny, Common Law Marriage:Civil Contractor
"CarnalCommerce, "J. KAN. B. AsS'N, April 2001, at 20, 21 (quoting In re Pace, 989 P.2d 297, 298
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999)).
14. See Barker v. Baker, 330 S.C. 361, 368, 499 S.E.2d 503, 507 (Ct. App. 1998).
15. See Kirby, 270 S.C. at 140,241 S.E.2d at 416 (citing Exparte Blizzard, 185 S.C. 131, 133, 193
S.E. 633, 634 (1937) (circuit order)).
16. See Callen, 365 S.C. at 624, 620 S.E.2d at 62.
17. Id.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (1976 & Supp. 2006).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Supp. 2006).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-100 (Supp. 2006).
21. Callen, 365 S.C. at 624, 620 S.E.2d at 62.
22. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Kirby, 270 S.C. 137, 141, 241 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1978)).
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civil ceremony or by recognizing their illicit relation and entering into a new
marital agreement.23
If the parties have the capacity to enter into a marriage, South Carolina
courts have unanimously held that a common law marriage is formed when the
"two parties have a present intent to enter into a marriage contract. 2 4 In Kirby,
the South Carolina Supreme Court noted, "The difference between marriage and
concubinage ... rests in the intent of the cohabiting parties; the physical and
temporal accompaniments of the cohabitation may be the same in both cases, but
the intent in the two cases is widely apart always."25 The court identified two
ways to demonstrate this intent: the parties can make a public and unequivocal
declaration of their intent to be married, or they can show evidence of the
circumstances surrounding their situation.26 Yet because a party's intent is rarely
formally and publicly declared, direct evidence of this intent is generally not
available. 27 Therefore, South Carolina allows circumstantial evidence of a
couple's intent to provide a rebuttable presumption of common law marriage.28
The typical circumstantial evidence parties rely upon to establish a common law
marriage includes evidence showing the parties have cohabited for an extended
period of time and have held themselves out to the public as husband and wife.29
Therefore, if a claimant "presents proof of apparently matrimonial cohabitation
and long-term social acceptance of the couple as married, a presumption arises
that the couple entered into a common-law marriage." 3 If such facts are proven

23. Id.(quoting Kirby, 270 S.C. at 141, 241 S.E.2d at 416).
24. Tarnowski v. Lieberman, 348 S.C. 616, 619, 560 S.E.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing
Barker v. Baker, 330 S.C. 361,370,499 S.E.2d 503,208 (Ct. App. 1998)); see also Johnson v. Johnson,
235 S.C. 542, 550, 112 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1960) ("It is essential to a common law marriage that there
shall be a mutual agreement between the parties to assume toward each other the relation of husband
and wife. Cohabitation without such an agreement does not constitute marriage."); Rodgers v. Herron,
226 S.C. 317, 335, 85 S.E.2d 104, 113 (1954)(citing Tedder v. Tedder, 108 S.C. 271,276, 94 S.E. 19,
20 (1917)) (indicating a common law marriage "depends upon facts and circumstances evidencing a
mutual agreement to live together as husband and wife, and not in concubinage").
25. Kirby, 270 S.C. at 140, 241 S.E.2d at 416.
26. See id.
27. Barker, 330 S.C. at 367, 499 S.E.2d at 507.
28. Id. at 368-69, 499 S.E.2d at 507.
29. Id. at 368, 499 S.E.2d at 507; see, e.g., Kirby, 270 S.C. at 141, 241 S.E.2d at 417 (1978)
(finding a common law marriage where the community recognized the parties as husband and wife, the
parties appeared as husband and wife on their children's birth certificates, and the parties filed joint tax
returns); Campbell v. Christian, 235 S.C. 102, 108, 110 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1959) (finding a common law
marriage where the parties resided together for twenty-four years, the community recognized the couple
as husband and wife, and the public authority declared the children born to the parties during this time
were in wedlock); cf Cathcart v. Cathcart, 307 S.C. 322, 324, 414 S.E.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. 1992)
(finding no common law marriage where the parties testified they did not intend to be married, "did not
refer to each other as husband and wife," "did not file joint tax returns," and did not have the same
mailing address).
30. Barker, 330 S.C. at 368-69, 499 S.E.2d at 507.
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by a preponderance of the evidence, South Carolina courts will recognize a valid
common law marriage. 3
IIl.

HISTORY OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE

A.

The European and English Origins

Common law marriage enjoys a deep, rich tradition developed "in the
informal forms of marriage common in Europe prior to the Reformation." 32
Marriage was initially treated as a private matter between families; it was not a
matter for state involvement.33 Thus, while noble or wealthy families relied on
formal marriage in order to protect their economic interests, the majority of the
population relied on informal unions.34 Generally, two persons would do little
more than indicate their intention to be married and then begin to live together
as husband and wife.35
The early Roman Catholic Church accepted the idea that a man and woman
could form their own agreement to be married. 36 However, in 1563, the Council
of Trent passed a decree requiring marriages to be performed in the presence of
a priest and other witnesses. 37 Despite this change in Roman Catholic canon law,
England continued to recognize informal marriages until 1753 when Parliament
passed Lord Hardwicke's Act. 38 The Act abolished common law marriage and
instituted a requirement that Church of England clergy perform marriage
cermonies in order for them to be valid.39
B.

Common Law Marriagein the Early American Settlements

Early American colonists brought the English common law to the colonies,
but from the beginning, the recognition of common law marriage was mixed.4 °
Some colonies enacted legislation regulating marriage and interpreted the
legislation as an abrogation of common law marriage. 4' Others recognized
common law marriage as valid, having brought the tradition to the American
settlements prior to Lord Hardwicke's Act.4" In 1809, a New York court was the

31. Id.at 369, 499 S.E.2d at 507 (citing Kirby, 270 S.C. at 141, 241 S.E.2d at 416; Yarbrough v.
Yarbrough, 280 S.C. 546, 551, 314 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ct. App. 1984)).
32. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A FeministProposalto Bring Back Common Law Marriage,75 OR.
L. REV.709, 718 (1996).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Crawley, supra note 1, at 401.
37. Bowman, supra note 32, at 718-19.
38. Note, Common Law Marriage-ALegal Anachronism, 32 IND. L.J. 99, 100 (1956).
39. Bowman, supra note 32, at 719.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.at 719-20.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 555

first in the country to affirm common law marriage in Fenton v. Reed,43 where
the court held that formal marriage requirements were unnecessary to create a
valid marriage and that a present intent to be married established a valid
marriage just as it had under the English common law." Thus, even early in
American history, parties could enter into marriage either by adherence to
statutory regulations or through common law marriage.45
After the initial recognition of common law marriage in the American
colonies, the doctrine spread throughout the territories for various reasons. The
simplest explanation is based on the notion of America as an expanding frontier
society where "[t]he sparse settlements, the long distance to places of record,
' 46
bad roads, difficulties of travel, made access to officers or ministers difficult.
During this time, "marriage was a necessity as few women had independent
means of support, and the physical hardships of frontier life made survival easier
for married couples than for single persons. ' ' 47 Thus, the difficulty of entering
into a formal marriage solemnization and the benefits that married life provided
in the rough frontier promoted common law marriages during the early
settlement of the United States.48
While the common law marriage tradition was well suited to the frontier
conditions, other factors also contributed to its recognition in early America.
Most notable was the desire to protect women, and the family unit in general, by
allowing financially dependent women to look to the family for financial support
rather than to burden the towns.49 Common law marriage also legitimized the
children of such marriages and promoted marriage by converting what could be
deemed "subversive relationships" into marriages that satisfied societal norms.5 °
In an early South Carolina appellate case dealing with a claim of common law
marriage, the court noted that "in cases of this character the Court will, if
possible, give such a construction to the acts of the parties as will save the
reputation of the woman and free the children from the brand of bastardy."'" In
addition, "the American resistance to mandatory marriage formalities [could also

43.4 Johns. 52 (N.Y. 1809).
44. Id. at 53-54. The United States Supreme Court confirmed Fenton's reasoning nearly seventy
years later in Meister v. Moore and noted that state marriage regulations were "merely directory" unless
the state's legislature expressly indicated that all marriages not meeting the proscribed statutory
requirements were invalid. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78-79 (1877).
45. Bowman, supra note 32, at 721-22.
46. McChesney v. Johnson, 79 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
47. Note, supra note 38, at 101-02.
48. Bowman, supra note 32, at 722-23.
49. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 957, 968-69 (2000).
50. Id. at 969.
51. Lucken v. Wichman, 5 S.C. 411,414 (1874).
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be seen] as a manifestation of our individualist ethic and notions of privacy.

52

C. Origins of Common Law Marriage in South Carolina
As one of the original colonies, South Carolina adopted common law
marriage based upon a combination of the English common law,53 and an
interpretation of its own marriage statute as merely directory. 4 Fryer v. Fryer5
appears to be one of the first South Carolina cases of record addressing the issue
of common law marriage. As the court in Fryer noted,
Marriage [in South Carolina], so far as the law is concerned,
has ever been regarded as a mere civil contract. Our law
prescribes no ceremony. It requires nothing but the agreement
of the parties, with an intention that that agreement shall, per
se, constitute the marriage. They may express the agreement by
parol, they may signify it by whatever ceremony their whim, or
their taste, or their religious belief, may select: it is the
agreement itself, and not
the form in which it is couched, which
56
constitutes the contract.
More than one hundred years later, in State v. Ward,57 the supreme court agreed
that statutes prescribing license and ceremonial requirements for the
solemnization of marriage are merely directory, and failure to adhere to statutory
marriage requirements does "not render invalid a marriage entered into
according to the common law."58
South Carolina courts have since applied the common law marriage doctrine
in a variety of contexts, including probate claims,59 divorce claims, 6° and claims

52. Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation,Common Law Marriage,andthe Possibilityof a SharedMoral
Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1848 (1987) (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 69-78 (1985)).
53. See Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52 (N.Y. 1809).
54. Bowman, supra note 32, at 722.
55. 9 S.C. Eq. (Rich. Cas.) 85 (1832).
56. Id. at 92 (holding the widow of decedent had not previously entered into a common law
marriage, thus her marriage to decedent was valid and the inheritance rights set forth in decedent's will
could not be contested by children from decedent's prior marriage).
57. 204 S.C. 210, 28 S.E.2d 785 (1944).
58. Id.at 214-15, 28 S.E.2d at 786-87.
59. See In re Estate of Greenfield, 245 S.C. 595, 604, 141 S.E.2d 916, 920 (1965) (appointing
decedent's alleged widow as the administratrix of his estate after finding a common law marriage
existed between the couple); Campbell v. Christian, 235 S.C. 102, 109, 110 S.E.2d 1,5 (1959) (finding
decedent had previously entered a common law marriage and thus his subsequent marriage to the
claimant was invalid).
60. See Bochette v. Bochette, 300 S.C. 109, 110, 386 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ct. App. 1989)
(determining a common law marriage existed between the parties and upholding the lower court's
contempt order for husband's failure to pay alimony); Kirby v. Kirby, 270 S.C. 137, 142, 241 S.E.2d
415, 417 (1978) (finding a common law marriage existed between the parties and thus denying
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for government benefits.6 1 In Jeanes v. Jeanes,62 Justice Littlejohn noted in his
concurring opinion that the reasoning behind South Carolina's recognition of
common law marriage was "to legitimat[e] innocent children and adjust property
rights between the parties who treated each other the same as husband and
wife. ' 63 In addition, South Carolina's decision to grant a presumption in favor of
marriage when cohabitation appears to be matrimonial 64 indicates65 the state's
desire to promote legitimate, rather than "subversive," relationships.
IV.

THE ABOLITION OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN MOST U.S. JURISDICTIONS

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, many jurisdictions that previously
recognized common law marriage began to abolish the doctrine. 66 This rejection

of common law marriage occurred for a number of reasons, including
socioeconomic trends related to urbanization and industrialization,67 concerns
about fraud6 ' and the accuracy of land titles, 69 protection of family and the
institution of marriage, 7" racism,71 and concerns about government benefits.72

From the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the United States
experienced population growth and increased urbanization.73 The previously
agrarian economy experienced a dramatic transformation with the arrival of the
industrial age. 74 This growth and development obviated the frontier conditions
that originally made common law marriage necessary in many jurisdictions.75
In addition, the new American economy resulted in an accumulation of
wealth in private hands and likely "exacerbated the concern of influential people
with the protection of inheritance within the family and the transmission of
wealth to legitimate heirs. ' 76 Legislatures and judiciaries were motivated by the

respondent's request for an equitable interest in the appellant's property).
61. See Mincey v. Celebrezze, 249 F. Supp. 421,422-23 (D.S.C. 1966) (holding that claimant was
entitled to social security benefits on the basis of the decedent's earnings because a common law
marriage existed between the couple); Byers v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., 268 S.C. 68, 70-71, 231
S.E.2d 699,700-01 (1977) (finding appellant was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits where
no proof of a common law marriage existed between the appellant and deceased employee).
62. 255 S.C. 161, 177 S.E.2d 537 (1970).
63. Id. at 168-69, 177 S.E.2d 540-41 (Littlejohn, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 166, 177 S.E.2d at 539.
65. See Lucken v. Wichman, 5 S.C. 411,414 (1873) (noting how the court will, if possible, find
a common law marriage in order to save the reputation of the woman and her children).
66. See Bowman, supra note 32, at 731.
67. Id. at 731-32.
68. Id. at 733.
69. Id. at 735.
70. Id. at 736.
71. Id. at 738.
72. Id. at 741.
73. Id. at 732.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 733.
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fear of fraudulent claims to abolish common law marriage; they saw the doctrine
as encouraging perjury and fraud by unmarried cohabitants who hoped to gain
the financial benefits of marriage.77
Concern also grew over the perception that "[l]and titles [we]re jeopardized
by unrecorded marriages about which the owner could not know. '78 For
example, real estate investors feared that land titles could be called into question
if "an unknown and unrecorded alliance," such as that allowed by common law
marriage, could be asserted. 79 Thus, fear that title to property might be subject to
a judicial determination of whether a claimant's ancestor's marriage was valid
also weighed in favor of abolishing the common law marriage doctrine.8"
Another factor influencing the abolition of common law marriage was the
importance of protecting the traditional notions of marriage and family.8' Some
courts and legislatures felt the doctrine weakened "the institution of formal
marriage by attacking its sanctity and lending some of its benefits to those who
cohabited without the approval of the state., 82 A cultural shift toward sexual
liberation in the 1920s caused a perception that the marital institution might be
vulnerable; this perception was revitalized in the 1960s when young people
adopted novel cohabitation practices during the era's sexual revolution.83
Because of these lifestyle changes, courts and legislatures began to worry that
common law marriage was eroding the family structure by providing unmarried
cohabitants with the same legal rights enjoyed by partners in a conventional
marriage."
85
Racism also played a role in the abolition of common law marriage.
Following emancipation and the adoption of the post-Civil War amendments,
many states sought to limit African-Americans' right to marry by preventing
interracial marriages.86 Abolishing common law marriage helped achieve this
goal. 87 In addition, sociological and anthropological literature portrayed
"informal marriage []as an uncivilized custom, common only among African
Americans and lower-class groups. 88 The association of common law marriage
in the 1940s and 1950s with segments of the population that were widely
perceived as inferior weighed further in favor of the abolition of the doctrine.89

77. See id at 735; Walter O. Weyrauch, Informaland FormalMarriage-AnAppraisalof Trends
in Family Organization,28 U. CHi. L. REV. 88, 98-99 (1960).
78. Note, supra note 34, at 108-09.
79. Id.at 109 n.44 (citing Fred S. Hall, Common Law Marriagein New YorkState, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1930)).
80. Bowman, supra note 32, at 736.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.at 743-44.
84. Id.at 744.
85. Id. at 737.

86. d.at 738-39.
87. See, e.g., id
88. Id. at 745.
89. Id. at 745-46.
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Finally, an effort to prevent fraud and promote efficiency in the
administration of government benefit programs, such as social security and
workers' compensation, also spurred the abolition of common law marriage. 90
While some felt that new government agencies could adequately apply the state
standards for common law marriage to adjudicate administrative cases, others
argued that applying state law standards to determine whether a common law
marriage existed was unduly burdensome for agencies and advocated for the
abolition of the doctrine. 9'
All of these elements, from social factors like urbanization and racism to
judicial and administrative concerns about fraud and efficiency, influenced
courts and legislatures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they decided
whether to retain or abolish the common law marriage doctrine. As of 2006,
only eleven states and the District of Columbia recognized common law
marriage," indicating that criticism of the doctrine resulted in its widespread
abrogation. In order to determine the continued viability of the common law
marriage in contemporary society, the South Carolina legislature should analyze
the historical circumstances which led to the recognition of common law
marriage, as well as the factors that influenced the doctrine's abolition across the
country.
Historical circumstances that once promoted common law marriage, such as
frontier conditions, no longer exist.93 The development of a national
infrastructure for transportation and communication has essentially eliminated
the practical obstacles to fulfilling the statutory requirements for valid formal
marriages.94 Thus, it is logical for those jurisdictions that base their recognition
of common law marriage on the frontier rationale to abolish the doctrine.95 Yet
jurisdictions also recognized common law marriage as a safeguard for the role of
families, particularly in legitimizing children born from such relationships, and
also in providing financial security to women in common law marriages.96 The
abolition of the doctrine indicates that the new concerns over fraud, protection of
the institution of formal marriage, and the desire for certainty came to outweigh
these familial interests.
Many of the concerns that led to the demise common law marriage may
have been based on faulty reasoning or may no longer be relevant in
contemporary society. For example, the argument in favor of abolishing
common law marriage to protect the traditional notions of marriage and family is
insignificant now that cohabitation and alternative family models have become

90. Id. at 746.
91. Id. at 746-47.
92. See supra note 1.
93. Bowman, supra note 32, at 750.
94. See Bowman, supra note 32, at 750; Graham Kirkpatrick, Common-Law Marriages: Their
Common Law Basis and PresentNeed, 6 ST. Louis U. L.J. 30, 48 (1960).
95. Bowman, supra note 32, at 750.
96. Sonya C. Garza, Common Law Marriage:A Proposalforthe Revival ofa Dying Doctrine,40
NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 543 (2006); see Bowman, supra note 32, at 737.
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common and acceptable. In fact, some scholars argue that abolishing common
law marriage actually harms the institution of formal marriage "by failing to
honor the commitments and responsibilities undertaken by the parties." 97 Also,
the racist motivations for abolishing common law marriage during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries are not valid reasons for abrogating the doctrine
today.98 In addition, though the fear of fraudulent claims may have been a
legitimate one, and despite the perception that fraud was a widespread problem,
there is no record of problems arising from fraud perpetrated on courts applying
the common law marriage doctrine. 99 In reality, the high burden of proof
imposed on a claimant alleging common law marriage successfully sorted
fraudulent claims from legitimate ones.'00 If courts continue to require objective
evidence demonstrating the parties intended to be married, then "there is no
greater01danger of fraud on the court than in the trial of any other question of
1
fact."
The arguments favoring the abolition of common law marriage based on
administrative and judicial efficiency were the strongest and remain so today.0 2
Essentially, the efficiency argument "can be evaluated only by asking whether
these concems are outweighed by values that may favor the retention of
common law marriage despite its costs."' 0 3 Relatively little is known about the
costs imposed by common law marriage due to a lack of empirical study on the
topic. However, in the past fifty years, South Carolina appellate courts have
addressed issues pertaining to the establishment of a common law marriage in at
least twenty-seven cases. °4 This number of cases does not include any of the

97. Bowman, supra note 32, at 737 (citing HOMER
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 59-62 (2d ed. 1998)).

H.

CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC

98. Id. at 751.
99. Id.at 741-42.
100. Crawley, supra note 1, at 424.
101. Kandoian, supra note 52, at 1851 (citing CLARK, supra note 99, at 57-58).
102. Bowman, supra note 32, at 752.
103. Id. at 753.
104. This number includes all South Carolina state appellate cases of record from 1957 through
2006 that either deal with the issue of whether a common law marriage existed or refer to an earlier
determination ofcommon law marriage-regardless of whether the common law marriage is being used
to establish a claim of right or is being used as a defense against persons attacking the validity of the
marriage. See Thomas v. McGriff, 368 S.C. 485,629 S.E.2d 359 (2006); Callen v. Callen, 365 S.C. 618,
620 S.E.2d 59 (2005); Christy v. Christy, 354 S.C. 203, 580 S.E.2d 444 (2003); Kirby v. Kirby, 270
S.C. 137, 241 S.E.2d 415 (1978); Byers v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., 268 S.C. 68, 231 S.E.2d 699
(1977); Rogers v. Rogers, 260 S.C. 613, 197 S.E.2d 921 (1973); Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 177
S.E.2d 537 (1970); In re Estate ofGreenfield, 245 S.C. 595, 141 S.E.2d 916 (1965); Mitchell v. Smyser,
236 S.C. 332, 114 S.E.2d 226 (1960); Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S.C. 542, 112 S.E.2d 647 (1960);
v. Pirri,
369 S.C. 258, 631 S.E.2d 279
Campbell v. Christian, 235 S.C. 102, 110 S.E.2d 1 (1959); Pirri
(Ct. App. 2006); Lukich v. Lukich, 368 S.C. 47, 627 S.E.2d 754 (Ct. App. 2006); Miles v. Miles, 355
S.C. 511,586 S.E.2d 136 (Ct. App. 2003); Tipton v. Tipton, 351 S.C. 456, 570 S.E.2d 195 (Ct. App.
2002); Tarnowski v. Lieberman, 348 S.C. 616, 560 S.E.2d 438 (Ct. App. 2002); Barker v. Baker, 330
S.C. 361, 499 S.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1998); Owens v. Owens, 320 S.C. 543, 466 S.E.2d 373 (Ct. App.
1996); Hallums v. Bowens, 318 S.C. 1,428 S.E.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1993); Johns v. Johns, 309 S.C. 199,
420 S.E.2d 856 (Ct. App. 1992); Cathcart v. Cathcart, 307 S.C. 322, 414 S.E.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1992);
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claims resolved by administrative boards, family courts, or probate courts, nor
does it tell anything about the number of claims brought each year that are
settled prior to litigation.
Despite the lack of empirical information regarding the number of common
law marriage claims brought in South Carolina each year, it is evident from the
number of claims reaching the appellate level that the common law marriage
doctrine imposes costs on the South Carolina judicial system. To determine if
these costs are justified, they must be balanced against the impact that the
abolition of common law marriage would create in the state. Cynthia Grant
Bowman argues that the nonrecognition of common law marriage "in fact leaves
one party, usually the woman, without important forms of economic
protection-pensions, Social Security survivors' benefits, alimony, or other
property rights-and may allow the other party, usually the man, to walk away
from a committed relationship with the fruits of their common labor."'' 5
Bowman concludes:
[T]he impact of abolishing common law marriage falls most
heavily on some of the most vulnerable persons in our society:
women who have been widowed or abandoned or who have
lost their husbands to industrial accidents or other types of
accidents; victims of domestic violence; and, most especially,
06
those who are poor and not well educated.1
Bowman makes these assertions after looking at the jurisdictions that have
abrogated common law marriage and assessing the groups that are impacted by
this decision; therefore, one would expect that in a jurisdiction which permits
common law marriage claims, the majority of claims would be brought by
persons most in need of the institution. Based on this analysis, the majority of
common law marriage claims in South Carolina should be brought by
economically dependent women seeking inheritance rights, workers'
compensation or social security benefits, or a division of property after the
termination of a relationship. However, the cases reaching the appellate courts in
South Carolina do not necessarily indicate this trend. Of the twenty-seven South
Carolina state appellate cases evaluating claims of common law marriage within
the past fifty years, women (or children claiming a right derivative from women)

Bochette v. Bochette, 300 S.C. 109, 386 S.E.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1989); Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345,
377 S.E.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1989); Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. English, 295 S.C. 511, 512,369 S.E.2d 395
(Ct. App. 1988); Cartee v. Cartee, 295 S.C. 103,366 S.E.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1988); Weathers v. Bolt, 293
S.C. 486, 361 S.E.2d 773 (Ct. App. 1987); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 280 S.C. 546, 314 S.E.2d 16 (Ct.
App. 1984).
105. Bowman, supra note 32, at 737.
106. Id.at 769.
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brought fourteen claims, 0 7 and men (or children claiming a right derivative from

men) brought twelve claims.'0 8 Of those claims brought by women (or their
children), four sought inheritance rights, 0 9 nine sought divorce and property
distribution,"' and one sought receipt of government benefits."' On the other

hand, of the claims brought by men (or their children), four were seeking
inheritance rights, 1 2 two were seeking divorce and property distribution (or were
defending against a divorce claim)," 3 none were seeking receipt of government
benefits, and six were seeking a termination of alimony payments or defending
non-payment of alimony based on an ex-wife's subsequent common law
marriage. 4

Based on this initial analysis, men may be just as likely as women to bring
common law marriage claims. However, while men bring some of the same
types of inheritance and division of property claims, many of the men's claims
are attempts to terminate their alimony requirements by alleging their former
spouse has entered into a common law marriage with a cohabitant. On the other

hand, women are more likely to bring claims for divorce and property
distribution or inheritance. Thus, these cases show a modem trend of men using

107. See Callen, 365 S.C. at 622, 620 S.E.2d at 61; Kirby, 270 S.C. at 139, 241 S.E.2d at 415;
Byers, 268 S.C. at 70,231 S.E.2d at 700; In re Estate of Greenfield, 245 S.C. at 597, 141 S.E.2d at 917;
Mitchell, 236 S.C. at 333, 114 S.E.2d at 226-27; Campbell,235 S.C. at 104, 110 S.E.2d at 2; Pirri,369
S.C. at 262-63, 631 S.E.2d at 282; Lukich, 368 S.C. at 50, 627 S.E.2d at 755; Tarnowski, 348 S.C. at
618,560 S.E.2d at 439; Owens, 320 S.C. at 544, 466 S.E.2d at 374; Hallums, 318 S.C. at 2,428 S.E.2d
at 894; Johns, 309 S.C. at 200, 420 S.E.2d at 857; Bochette, 300 S.C. at 110, 386 S.E.2d at 476;
Prevatte,297 S.C. at 346, 377 S.E.2d at 115.
108. See Thomas, 368 S.C. at 486-87, 629 S.E.2d at 359; Christy, 354 S.C. at 204, 580 S.E.2d at
445; Rogers, 260 S.C. at 614, 197 S.E.2d at 922; Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 163, 177 S.E.2d at 538; Johnson,
235 S.C. at 545, 112 S.E.2d at 648; Miles, 355 S.C. at 515, 586 S.E.2d at 138; Tipton, 351 S.C. at 457,
570 S.E.2d at 196; Barker, 330 S.C. at 363, 499 S.E.2d at 504; Cathcart, 307 S.C. at 323-24, 414
S.E.2d at 812; Cartee, 295 S.C. at 104,366 S.E.2d at 269; Weathers, 293 S.C. at 487,361 S.E.2d at 773;
Yarbrough, 280 S.C. at 548, 314 S.E.2d at 17. The twenty-seventh case, RichlandMemorial Hospital
v. English, was brought by a creditor, rather than a party to the relationship. 295 S.C. at 512,369 S.E.2d
at 395; see infra text accompanying note 191.
109. See In re Estate of Greenfield,245 S.C. at 597,141 S.E.2d at 917; Mitchell, 236 S.C. at 333,
114 S.E.2d at 226-27; Campbell, 235 S.C. at 104, 110 S.E.2d at 2; Tarnowski, 348 S.C. at 619, 560
S.E.2d at 440.
110. See Callen, 365 S.C. at 622, 620 S.E.2d at 61; Kirby, 270 S.C. at 139, 241 S.E.2d at 415;
Pirri,369 S.C. at 262, 631 S.E.2d at 282; Lukich, 368 S.C. at 50, 627 S.E.2d at 755-56; Owens, 320
S.C. at 544, 466 S.E.2d at 374; Hallums, 318 S.C. at 2,428 S.E.2d at 894; Johns, 309 S.C. at 200, 420
S.E.2d at 857; Bochette, 300 S.C. at 110, 386 S.E.2d at 476; Prevatte, 297 S.C. at 346, 377 S.E.2d at
115.
111. See Byers, 268 S.C. at 70, 231 S.E.2d at 700.
112. See Thomas, 368 S.C. at 487,629 S.E.2d at 359; Johnson, 235 S.C. at 545, 112 S.E.2d at 648;
Barker,330 S.C. at 363, 499 S.E.2d at 504; Weathers, 293 S.C. at 487, 361 S.E.2d at 773.
113. See Tipton, 351 S.C. at 457, 570 S.E.2d at 195-96; Yarbrough, 280 S.C. at 548, 314 S.E.2d
at 17.
114. See Christy v. Christy, 354 S.C. 203,204,580 S.E.2d 444,445 (2003); Rogers v. Rogers, 260
S.C. 613, 614, 197 S.E.2d 921, 922 (1973); Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 163, 177 S.E.2d 537, 538
(1970); Miles v. Miles, 355 S.C. 511, 515, 586 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Ct. App. 2003); Cathcart v. Cathcart,
307 S.C. 322, 323-24,414 S.E.2d 811,812 (Ct. App. 1992); Cartee v. Cartee, 295 S.C. 103, 104, 366
S.E.2d 269, 269 (Ct. App. 1988).
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the common law marriage doctrine as a sword, while women use the doctrine as
a shield. This analysis supports the assertion that the abolition of the common
law marriage doctrine may indeed have a negative impact on economically
dependent women in informal marital relationships.
Even if women do bring the majority of common law marriage claims,
particularly the claims seeking rights to property or benefits, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that women still need the state to protect their
dependency interests. From American colonization into the nineteenth century,
the common law marriage doctrine's concern for female dependency was based
on "a range of socio-cultural assumptions about women's nature and women's
roles within the family and the polity.""' 5 Women were forced into this
dependency based on the political and social culture of the time, and thus
common law marriage allowed courts to privatize this economic dependency." 6
"By declaring a woman to be a man's wife or widow at common law, courts
shielded the public fisc from the potential claims of needy women, effectively
deflecting those claims inward to a particular private, family unit." ' 7
Yet "[t]he Twentieth Century ...heralded the legal, social, and economic
independence of the American woman.""..8 Contemporary American culture
espouses equality of the sexes and has largely rejected the gender roles that
divided men and women. Women comprise nearly half of the workforce,19 earn
more college degrees than men, 2 ° and continue to close the wage gap. 2 '
Therefore, any modem notion of female dependency must be different from the
dependency courts and legislators envisioned during early American history.
Because of the vast opportunities for women today, the abolition of common law
marriage, while perhaps still negatively impacting women, may not lead to the
same severe consequences experienced in the past.
Regardless of whether men or women bring common law marriage claims,

abolishing the doctrine will likely have the most adverse effects on persons of
low socioeconomic status. While persons of all socioeconomic groups engage in
unmarried cohabitation and informal unions, these informal unions are more

115. Dubler, supra note 49, at 963.
116. Id.at 969.
117. Id.
118. Note, supra note 38, at 102.
119. See Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, Quick Stats 2005,
http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/main.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (noting that as of 2005, "women
represented 46 percent of the total U.S. labor force").
120. Jeff Grabmeier, Better Grades and GreaterIncentives Help Explain Why Women Outpace
Men in College Degrees,OHIO ST.RES.NEWS, http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/womcolge.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2007) ("In 2004, women received 58 percent of all bachelor's degrees in the United
States ....).
121. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN INTHE LABOR FORCE:
A DATABOOK 1 (2005), availableat http:www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2005.pdf (finding that from
1979 to 2004, the ratio of women's earnings relative to men's earnings has increased from 62% to
80%).
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prevalent among low income groups than any others.12 1 In addition, it is the poor
and uneducated who often believe that their informal relationships qualify as
valid marriages, even in states where common law marriage has been
abolished.123 Based on this belief, these persons expect to receive the benefits
that flow from marriage, such as inheritance rights, social security survivors'
benefits and workers' compensation death benefits, the right to support,
alimony, and property division upon dissolution of the relationship, and even
potential tax benefits. A state's abolition of common law marriage thus may
have the greatest impact upon those members of society who can least afford to
give up any part
of the limited protections the common law marriage doctrine
24
affords them.
While it seems as though the abolition of common law marriage would have
some negative impact on economically dependent persons, the full cost of this
impact cannot be determined without analyzing the other remedies available to
unmarried cohabitants relying on their common law marriage. If these remedies
can decrease the burden on the disparately impacted groups, the benefits of
judicial and administrative efficiency and certainty may tip the scales toward
abolishing the common law marriage doctrine in South Carolina.
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO COMMON LAW MARRIAGE

Although most states abolished the common law marriage doctrine during
the last century, these states still faced the problem of determining how to
protect the expectation and dependency interests of unmarried cohabitating
partners when the relationship dissolved. Even in those states where the common
law marriage doctrine continues to exist, the dependency problems remain for
those cohabitants who cannot meet the high evidentiary standards required to
prove a common law marriage, and for those cohabitants who live together with
no immediate plans for marriage. To combat these issues, some states now
permit unmarried cohabitants to retain certain property rights following the
death of a partner or dissolution of the relationship.' 25 States may provide these
remedies "[a]s an alternative to recognizing common-law marriage, or in
addition to recognizing the doctrine ....,,126
The various remedies states provide
for unmarried cohabitants include contractual and quasi-contractual remedies,' 27
equitable remedies such as unjust enrichment and estoppel, 12 "all-or-nothing"

122. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 32, at 766 (citations omitted) (observing that informal unions
are most common among the lower socioeconomic and educational levels); JOHN SIRJAMAKI, THE
AMERICAN FAMILY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 69 (1953) (observing that common law marriage is
common among lower socioeconomic classes).
123. Bowman, supra note 32, at 766.
124. See id.at 769.
125. Crawley, supra note 1, at 410.
126. Id.
127. Bowman, supra note 32, at 772-74.
128. Id.at 771-74.
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approaches based on statutory marital status, 1 29 and piecemeal approaches based
on state-determined escape routes. 3 ° While each remedy offers its own
advantages and disadvantages, state legislatures have a wide array of options
based on various policy considerations that can help protect unmarried
cohabitants.
A.

Contractualand Quasi-ContractualRemedies

Several jurisdictions recognize contract-based remedies with regard to
property division for cohabiting couples who fail to meet their state's statutory
marriage requirements.' Some of the jurisdictions recognize these claims only
while others allow recovery under
if they are based on express contract,'
express and implied contracts."' The famous California case of Marvin v.
Marvin3 4 addressed the issue of contract-based remedies and held that express
contracts between nonmarried partners should be enforced unless consideration
is based on sexual services and therefore contrary to public policy. 135 In
addition, the court held that if the parties do not have an express contract, the
court should evaluate the parties' conduct to determine if an implied contract
exists. 131
Despite offering one avenue to protect the interests of couples outside the
realm of formal marriage, the express and implied contract-based remedies do
not offer a complete solution. 37 First, it is unlikely that most cohabitating
couples will enter into an express agreement regarding the rights of the parties
upon dissolution of the relationship. Thus, "[c]ouples who enter into a
relationship assuming that they will share their labor, resources, and
accumulated capital are without remedy if they do not examine these
38
assumptions consciously enough to trigger the obligations we call 'contract.''1
Marvin's implied contract framework poses the same issues of intent that arise
in common law marriage cases,' 39 therefore, the adjudication of any claim
remains an intensely factual dispute. Also, while contract-based theories may
work for property division and support obligations, it does not apply to

129. Crawley,supra note 1, at 413-15.
130. Bowman, supra note 32, at 774-76.
131. Crawley, supra note 1, at 412.
132. Id. These jurisdictions include Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and
New York. Id.
133. Id. Jurisdictions that have recognized express agreements, without speaking to implied
agreements, include Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Wyoming. Id.Florida, Minnesota, and North Dakota
allow recovery if the express agreement is in writing. Id.
134. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
135. Id. at 116.
136. Id. at 122.
137. See Bowman, supra note 32, at 774.
138. Id.
139. Crawley, supra note 1,at 415.
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government benefits. 4 ° Thus, Marvin-type remedies offer some protection for
parties after the dissolution of a nonmarital relationship; however, the protection
is limited."'
B. Equitable Remedies
Other alternatives to common law marriage that seek to protect the interests

of unmarried cohabitants are the equitable remedies of unjust enrichment and
estoppel. Several courts have recognized restitution claims between former
cohabitants based on the theory of unjust enrichment.'4 2 These courts allow

claimants to recover by imposing a resulting or constructive trust in property
accumulated during the time of cohabitation.' 43 In fact, the Restatement (Third)
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment specifically provides for this type of relief
if one former cohabitant "owns a specific asset to which the other has made
' 44
substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form of property or services."'
Under the Restatement, "the person making such contributions has a claim in
restitution against
the owner of the asset as necessary to prevent unjust
4
1'

enrichm ent.

1

In addition to unjust enrichment, Tennessee employs the equitable doctrine
of estoppel to protect the expectation interests of unmarried cohabitants and
146
third parties when the cohabitants have held themselves out as married.
Notably, the Tennessee estoppel doctrine, which is a variant of common law

marriage, prevents a man who has held himself out to be a woman's husband
from denying "his liability for any contracts made by the woman in the position

140. Bowman, supra note 32, at 774; Garza, supra note 96, at 549.
141. Bowman, supra note 32, at 774.
142. See, e.g., Padilla v. Padilla, 100 P.2d 1093, 1093-94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940) (affirming
a judgment declaring and enforcing a resulting trust between unmarried cohabitants); Evans v. Wall,
542 So. 2d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding the female cohabitant maintained a
constructive trust interest in certain property in which she invested in improvements during the period
of cohabitation because her investments of time and money would have otherwise unjustly enriched her
cohabiting partner); Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372, 1374-75 (Mass. 1989) (finding a female
cohabitant who gave up her career and maintained a home for herself and the male cohabitant would
be entitled to a one-half interest in the property by way of constructive trust); Hughes v. Bailey, 195
A.2d 281, 283, 285, 286 (Pa. 1963) (finding a resulting trust where the plaintiff paid one-half of the
purchase price of the property).
143. See supra note 142.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28, at 24 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2004).
145. Id.
146. See Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375,380 (Tenn. 2006) (noting that marriage by estoppel
"is applicable only in exceptional circumstances" and then "the marriage is presumed to be valid even
though it is not technically lawful"); Robert E. Kendrick, Note, Informal Marriages in
Tennessee-Marriageby Estoppel, by Prescription,and by Ratification, 3 VAND. L. REV. 610,614-15
(1950) (explaining Tennessee's use of estoppel to "hold parties to an informal marriage to obligations
normally incidental to statutory marriages"); see also Bowman, supra note 32, at 771-72 (arguing the
estoppel doctrine could be used on a larger scale to cure many of the problems surrounding
nonrecognition of common law marriage).
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of a common law wife, on the theory that he should not be allowed to claim any
right or exemption on account of his own crime."' 47 Tennessee has also allowed
in claims of widows against an estate,'48 and in suits for
this estoppel argument
49
1
child support.
Marsha Garrison argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could easily
be used as a remedy for protecting the rights of couples not adhering to state
marriage requirements, but who have held themselves out to be married. 5 °
Garrison concludes that the estoppel doctrine would prevent a couple that
portrayed themselves as married from denying the marriage to a partner or third
party who relied on the representation.' 5 ' In fact, Garrison argues that the
estoppel doctrine is more advantageous than the common law marriage doctrine
because it does not focus on subjective intent, but instead looks at objective
actions such as using the same last name, maintaining joint bank accounts, or
filing joint tax returns.'52 These concrete actions would "justifiably lead each
partner [and third parties] to assume a marital agreement" exists.'53 Based on this
analysis, the equitable estoppel principle could effectively serve as an alternative
remedy to the common law marriage doctrine, especially in those situations
where courts are concerned about protecting dependent spouses who have relied
upon their partners' representations.
Despite the advantages offered by the equitable remedies of unjust
enrichment and estoppel, these doctrines are fraught with complications for the
unmarried cohabitant. The comments to the Restatement recognize that the
outcome of an inquiry into unjust enrichment between unmarried cohabitants
54
cannot be predicted due to the fact-intensive nature of each particular case.
Thus, with these types of equitable claims, "[p]arties do not know where they
stand in advance, and when disputes arise, there is no framework for
compromise. This ... imposes costs on the legal system."' 55 In addition, these
equitable remedies, like the contract-based remedies, only address the issue of
property distribution between the parties and fail to address situations involving
claims for government benefits. 56 Although the doctrine of estoppel "could

147. Bowman, supra note 32, at 771.
148. See Smith v. N. Memphis Sav. Bank, 89 S.W. 392, 397-08 (Tenn. 1905) (establishing the
theory of marriage by estoppel by finding the estate of a man, who lived with the claimant for more than
twenty-five years and held her out to the world as his wife, was estopped from contesting her claim as
his widow).
149. Allen v. Allen, 8 Tenn. App. 48, 51 (1928) (applying the doctrine of marriage by estoppel in
suit for child support to estop a man from denying a marriage and thus the legitimacy of his children).
150. Marsha Garrison, Is ConsentNecessary? An Evaluation ofthe Emerging Law ofCohabitant
Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REv. 815, 886 (2005).
151. Id. at 886-87.
152. Id. at 887.
153. Id.
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c, at 29

(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004).
155. Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, andJustice: Restitution Between Cohabitants,77 U. COLO. L.
REv. 711,735(2006).
156. Bowman, supra note 32, at 774.
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theoretically be used to address many of the problems raised by the
nonrecognition of common law marriage," it "exists in only one state, and the
courts of that state have in fact pulled back from applying the doctrine in many
157
cases."'
C. The All-or-Nothing Approach
Another possible remedy for dealing with the rights of unmarried
cohabitants is essentially an all-or-nothing approach based on statutory marital
status. Illinois adheres to this approach, as illustrated by the case of Hewitt v.
Hewitt.'58 Victoria Hewitt and Robert Hewitt began their relationship as college
students in 1960.1'9 The couple told their parents they were married after
discovering Victoria was pregnant.' 60 Thereafter, the couple held themselves out
to the community as a married couple and raised three children together. 6 '
Victoria alleged that during this time, she helped pay for Robert's education and
assisted him in his lucrative medical practice.'62 After their relationship
dissolved, Victoria brought a claim against Robert alleging that they had an
express or implied contract to share the property accumulated during their
relationship and that Robert had been unjustly enriched.'63
The Illinois Supreme Court held that all of Victoria's claims were
unenforceable because the statutory scheme imposed by the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution Act disfavored "the grant of mutually enforceable property
rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants."' 64 In deciding whether to recognize
the claims, the court stated,
The issue of unmarried cohabitants' mutual property rights...
cannot appropriately be characterized solely in terms of
contract law, nor is it limited to considerations of equity or
fairness as between the parties to such relationships. . . .Of
substantially greater importance than the rights of the
immediate parties is the impact of such recognition upon our
society and the institution of marriage.'6 5
As demonstrated by the facts of the case, the holding in Hewitt may impose
harsh results, but parties in Illinois can rely on the certainty of marital status in
adjudicating claims based on traditional marital rights. While this approach

157. Id.at 772.
158. 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (111.1979).
159. Id.at 1205.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1211.
165. Id.at 1207.
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would not alleviate the negative impact imposed by the abolition of common
law marriage in South Carolina, the all-or-nothing model promotes the highest
level of judicial efficiency and certainty by disallowing unmarried parties'
claims.
D. The PiecemealApproach

Some states have adopted a piecemeal approach in dealing with the issues of
unmarried cohabitants; they attempt to deal with each legal area affecting
unmarried cohabitants on an individual basis.' 66 To do this, states may draft the
relevant statutes to include unmarried cohabitants or apply the statutes to those
situations previously addressed by common law marriage.' 67 For example, if
South Carolina abolished common law marriage but wanted to protect parties
previously covered by the doctrine in connection with workers' compensation
benefits, the state could statutorily redefine the class entitled to workers'
compensation death benefits. 168 Likewise, the Social Security statute could be
changed to accomplish the same outcome. 169 South Carolina could also
statutorily recognize common law marriage solely for specific purposes, such as
inheritance rights. 7 ° New Hampshire, for example, does not recognize common
law marriage but statutorily creates a limited recognition of the doctrine upon
the death of a common law spouse. 7' If persons in the state have lived together
for at least three years and have acknowledged each other as husband and wife,
the New Hampshire statute treats these cohabitants as married for purposes of
inheritance and government death benefits.' 72
There are several disadvantages to the piecemeal approach.' 73 First, this
remedy is not likely to offer comprehensive protection for unmarried cohabitants
or others impacted by the abolition of common law marriage because states may
only choose to address specific legal areas rather than every potential legal
issue. 74 In addition, the piecemeal approach is a time consuming and politically
difficult process because it requires legislators "to identify and change
definitions in every relevant [state] statute ...

,

as well as the applicable federal

statutes."' 75 Thus, while the piecemeal approach allows states to make specific
policy choices regarding the rights of unmarried cohabitants and grant these

166. Bowman, supra note 32, at 774-75.
167. Id.at 775.
168. See id. The Indiana workers' compensation statute has this effect by using the term
"dependent" rather than "wife." Id.(citing Ind. Code Ann. § 22-3-6-1 (LexisNexis 1997 & Supp.
2006)).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 770-71.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 457-39 (1992 & Supp. 2006).
173. Bowman, supra note 32, at 775.
174. Id.at 776.
175. Id.at 775-76.
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cohabitants protections in certain areas, the remedy still falls short of the full

protections afforded by common law marriage.
E. UnmarriedCohabitants' Claims in South Carolina

Based on South Carolina case law, it is unclear whether the state courts
76

permit unmarried cohabitants to bring claims based in contract or equity.

Regardless of whether the doctrine of common law marriage is abolished, South
Carolina courts will still have to face these types of claims in dealing with
unmarried cohabitants who cannot establish a common law marriage. Thus, if
judicial efficiency and certainty are the primary reasons for abolishing common
law marriage, allowing contract and equitable claims will defeat these goals
because the courts will continue to adjudicate some of the same issues.
However, based on the various alternatives to common law marriage, the

legislature and courts can determine the appropriate path for balancing judicial
costs and protecting the expectations of unmarried cohabitants.
VI. OTHER AREAS OF LAW WHICH IMPOSE

A

TRADITIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

ON AN INFORMAL RELATIONSHIP

Common law marriage is not the only area of law that imposes a legal
relationship despite the failure to follow statutorily proscribed formalities. Our

judicial system is often forced to make choices in various legal settings as to
whether a legal relationship should be imposed when the formalities creating

that relationship have not been met. These determinations require courts or
legislatures to analyze the costs and benefits of imposing a legal relationship and
make a decision based on the interests of the parties or groups affected.' 77 These

choices have been made in the areas of partnership law through the imposition
of partnership agreements, property law through adverse possession, and
contract law through the statute of frauds.
A partnership may be formed without a written partnership agreement or
express oral agreement acknowledging the formation of the partnership.' 78 When

no partnership agreement exists, courts must determine if the relationship
between the parties constitutes an association between two or more persons to

176. In Dye v. Gainey, 320 S.C. 65, 463 S.E.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1995), the court permitted the
mistress of a married man to bring a constructive trust and equitable estoppel claim against the man
when he tried to evict her from a mobile home he owned. Id. at 66-67, 463 S.E.2d at 98. The court
concluded that this type of relationship could form the confidential relationship element required to
establish a constructive trust. Id. at 68-69, 463 S.E.2d at 99. Thus, it seems likely that South Carolina
courts would also permit unmarried cohabitants to bring such a claim based on a similar type of
confidential relationship.
177. See Bowman, supra note 32, at 753-54.
178. See, e.g., Wilder v. Hobson, 398 S.E.2d 625, 627 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Peed v. Peed,
325 S.E.2d 275, 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)) (finding the "existence of a partnership does not require an
express agreement"); Wyman v. Davis, 223 S.C. 172, 173, 74 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1953) (noting that a
partnership agreement may be implied and formed without express intention).
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carry on as co-owners in a business for profits.' 79 Thus, even where parties

undertake no formalities to create the partnership and where the parties may not
have even intended to create a partnership, the courts may impose such a
relationship based on the substantive nature of the relationship. 8 0
Similarly, adverse possession is a property law doctrine that confers rights
on persons who have not followed the legal formalities for obtaining a piece of
land. Adverse possession transfers "a legal interest in property from the original
owner to one who has acted as ifshe owned the land for a certain period of time,
regardless of whether or not that person actually has title to the land."'' Thus if
a person mimics the legal formalities of land ownership by acting like a
landowner, a court may grant that person legal title to the land over the claim of
the rightful owner.'82
In contrast, the contractual doctrine of the statute of frauds demonstrates an
area of law where courts will not impose a legal relationship unless the legal
formalities of a writing requirement have been met. 183 The original statute of
frauds was enacted by the English Parliament in 1677 to prevent fraud and
perjury.' 84 The doctrine persists in the United States, arguably for the same
reasons, and perhaps as a form of consumer protection.' 85 By maintaining the
statute of frauds, the legislatures have determined that some contracts are so
important they must be reduced to writing, and a failure to follow such
formalities will result in the contract being unenforceable. Despite the potential
for harsh results, the legislature has made a policy choice favoring certainty
despite any negative consequences.' 86
In each of these settings, courts and legislatures imposed legal relationships
when the parties failed to follow the traditional frameworks for creating the
relationships. The rationale for the decision in each area may be different. For
example, in the partnership law arena, the rationale may be based on the desire
to protect innocent third parties.' 87 In the adverse possession arena, the doctrine

179. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-210 (2006) (adopting the Uniform Partnership Act).
180. Fischer v. Brancato, 937 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Bernard McMenamy
Contractor, Inc. v. Kitchen, 692 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
181. Jessica A. Clarke, Adverse Possession ofIdentity: Radical Theory, ConventionalPractice,
84 OR. L. REv. 563, 565-66 (2005).
182. Id. at 566.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981) (setting forth the classes of
contracts covered by the statute of frauds writing requirement).
184. Note, The Doctrine ofEquitableEstoppel and the Statute of Frauds,66 MICH. L. REV. 170,
170 (1967) (quoting 29 Car. 11, c.3 (1677)).
185. See Phillipp v. Shapell Indus., Inc., 743 P.2d 1279, 1289 (Cal. 1987) (noting the California
legislature's desire to protect consumers by requiring certain contracts to be in writing).
186. In reality, however, states have lessened the harsh effects of the statute of frauds through
equitable doctrines. See, e.g., Farmers Bank & Trust Co. of Georgetown, Ky. v. Wilmott Hardwoods,
Inc., 171 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Ky. 2005) (citing Smith v. Ash, 448 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Ky. 1969)) ("Estoppel is
a doctrine of equity, and equitable relief may be granted to relieve the harsh effects of the statute of
frauds.").
187. See Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731, 733-36 (Mass. 1996) (discussing how
agency principles apply to partnerships to protect the interests of third parties).
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may be used to reward the productive use of land' 88 and "protect the reliance
interests of the [adverse] possessor."' 8 9 Yet all the rationales have one thing in
common: they reflect a cost-benefit analysis where the legislatures and courts
decided when it is necessary to impose legal relationships despite formalities,
and when it is not. The South Carolina legislature should use this cost-benefit
approach in assessing the propriety of abolishing the common law marriage
doctrine.
VII. ABROGATING

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA

An overview of South Carolina common law marriage claims demonstrates
the wide variety of contexts in which claimants attempt to apply the doctrine.
While the traditional claims of common law marriage still exist in the context of
property distributions following the termination of a marriage or the death of one
of the parties, claimants today also assert the existence of a common law
marriage for other purposes. Male claimants frequently allege their former
spouse has entered into a common law marriage with a third party and thus seek
termination of alimony payments based on this remarriage or change in
circumstances. 9 ' In one unusual case, the creditor of a decedent successfully
brought a claim to impose common law marriage on the decedent's alleged
spouse in order to collect on an unpaid judgment.' 9'
Regardless of the context, all of these cases demonstrate that the factintensive nature of common law marriage claims makes the doctrine judicially
cumbersome. While some proponents of common law marriage argue the
doctrine is realistic and can be applied with "ease and certainty,' 92 these
arguments fail to take into account the unlikelihood of summary judgment given
the fact-sensitive nature of the claims. The strict standards required for
establishing a common law marriage may indeed sort out the fraudulent claims
from the legitimate ones, yet these claims still must be fully adjudicated in order
to reach this determination. Thus, this time-consuming process wastes the
resources of the courts and the parties involved. 193 Essentially, the recognition of
common law marriage is achieved "at the expense of clarity and

188. See Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REv. 135, 135 (1918)
(asserting that the policy rationale behind adverse possession is "to reward those using the land in a way
beneficial to the community").
189. Clarke, supra note 181, at 568.
190. See, e.g., Christy v. Christy, 354 S.C. 203, 204, 580 S.E.2d 444, 445 (2003); Rogers v.
Rogers, 260 S.C. 613, 614, 197 S.E.2d 921,922 (1973); Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 163, 177 S.E.2d
537, 538 (1970); Miles v. Miles, 355 S.C. 511,515,586 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Ct. App. 2003); Cathcart v.
Cathcart, 307 S.C. 322, 323-24, 414 S.E.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. 1992); Cartee v. Cartee, 295 S.C. 103,
104, 366 S.E.2d 269, 269 (Ct. App. 1988).
191. See Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. English, 295 S.C. 511, 512, 369 S.E.2d 395, 395 (Ct. App.
1988).
192. See Crawley, supra note 1, at 400.
193. Margaret M. Mahoney, ForcesShaping the Law of Cohabitationfor Opposite Sex Couples,
7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 183 (2005).
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predictability."' 94 "No one can be certain of a couple's marital status under the
common law marriage doctrine until a judicial determination is made .... The
resulting uncertainty creates costs for the courts, for couples . . . , and for the

third parties who
settings."' 95
In addition to
historical rationale
American culture.

deal with such couples in both private and commercial
the costs imposed by common law marriage claims, the
for adopting the doctrine no longer exists in contemporary
The frontier conditions the settlers faced do not exist in

modem society.'96 But more importantly, the need to protect economically

dependent women and to legitimize children can now be accomplished through
avenues other than common law marriage. Today, a child can receive support
and inheritance rights regardless of whether the child's parents are married to
each other. 97 While some women in informal marital relationships remain
financially dependent on their partners, these women may now employ the
various equitable remedies used by unmarried cohabitants in order to alleviate
their economic hardship. 198 In addition, the historical need to protect the
institution of marriage by creating a presumption in favor of marital rather than
subversive relationships no longer exists today given the general acceptance of
cohabitation of unmarried couples.

99

Finally, while common law marriage may have developed to protect the
property interests of parties, the rise in cohabitation rates and the general
acceptance of cohabitation in contemporary society may now allow common law
marriage to have the opposite effect. People today, for various reasons, often
make a cognizant choice not to marry and instead simply choose to live with a
partner, but common law marriage may force these people to defend an alleged
claim of marriage brought by a former partner after their relationship dissolves.
They may also be forced to defend a claim for liability by a third-party creditor
based on of the creditor's allegation of a common law marriage.2 ' Although
parties in cases such as this can argue they never possessed the intent required
for a common law marriage, they will still have to endure litigation due to the
fact-specific nature of common law marriage claims. Additionally, those
cohabitants who think they have entered into a common law marriage based on
promises from their partner that a marriage exists may find themselves in
jeopardy should they ever need to prove the existence of marriage. However,
abolishing common law marriage and relying solely on the statutory license

194. Id. at 183.
195. Id.at 183-84.
196. See supra note 92-95 and accompanying text.
197. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-90 (1976 & Supp. 2006) (requiring a parent to provide reasonable
support to his or her legitimate or illegitimate child); §§ 62-2-101 to -109 (1987 & Supp. 2006)
(allowing legitimate and illegitimate children to inherit by way of intestate succession).
198. See supra Part V.
199. See supra notes 97 and accompanying text.
200. See Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. English, 295 S.C. 511, 369 S.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1988).
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requirement would solve this problem and give couples a high degree of
certainty regarding their marital status.
Strict adherence to a license requirement would also obviate the burdens put
on third parties in determining the existence of a common law marriage. A
Pennsylvania court recently emphasized the interests of third parties in the
common law marriage context when the court stated it was time to abolish the
common law marriage doctrine:2"'
[U]ncertainty as to marital status has a far greater detrimental
impact on third parties today than when the [common law
marriage] doctrine was created. .

.

. In twenty-first century

commerce, third parties need and are entitled to know whether
the men, women and couples with whom they contract are
married or single, for that may significantly affect their rights.
Statutory marriage provides a certain record if third parties
chose to investigate; [on the other hand,] common law marriage
may be impossible to ascertain or verify until some dispute
brings about court proceedings. 02
Given that third parties now deal with both husbands and wives in relation to
business deals, particularly those involving credit transactions, the certainty of a
license requirement would protect these third parties from the uncertainty that
arises from common law marriage.2 3 The requirement would also protect
unmarried cohabitants from third party creditors who may try to use a claim of
common law marriage to secure a payment from a non-obligated partner.20 4
VIII.

CONCLUSION

When the South Carolina General Assembly again encounters an
opportunity to abolish common law marriage by way of a bill similar to House
Bill 3588, the House and Senate should vote to pass the bill and abrogate
common law marriage in the state. This abolition would promote judicial
efficiency and certainty because courts would no longer have to engage in factintensive inquiries relating to common law marriage claims. Instead, courts,
third parties, and cohabiting couples could rely on a bright-line rule that clearly
defines legal rights based on one simple requirement: a valid marriage license.
Although this abolition may have an impact on economically dependent women
and others who rely on their nonceremonial marital status to secure the benefits

201. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 831 A.2d 1269, 1272,1281 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2003).
202. Id. at 1281.
203.1d.
204. See English, 295 S.C. at 512, 369 S.E.2d at 395 (finding the decedent had entered into a
common law marriage, and thus his common law wife was liable to his creditor for the decedent's debt).
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of marriage, South Carolina courts can provide various equitable remedies to
deal with the these parties' claims and thus alleviate some of this negative
impact. Overall, the license requirement set forth in section 20-1-210 is a small
price to pay for certainty and efficiency in dealing with couples claiming rights
based on marriage.
Ashley Hedgecock
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